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Cross-border Insolvency Problems: Is the UNCITRAL                                 
Model Law the Answer? 
S.Chandra Mohan*+ 
School of Law, Singapore Management University 
 
Abstract   
This paper examines the impact that the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency 
has had on States in the light of the central problems often associated with transnational 
insolvencies. Despite the accolades that it has received, the Model Law has been adopted in 
only 19 countries in the last 15 years and that too in many different ways. If the number of 
adoptees and the rather conditional acceptance of the Model Law’s provisions represent a 
lack of international enthusiasm for adopting the Model Law, what are the reasons for this? 
The paper concludes by asking whether the UNCITRAL Model Law presently has a future in 
dealing with cross-border insolvencies. 
 
I. Introduction 
The phenomenal growth in international trade and investments has increased the incidence of 
corporate entities having businesses, assets, debtors and creditors in more than one country.1 
One disadvantage of such a global marketplace is that it brings about a corresponding risk of 
cross-border insolvencies since businesses risk failure.2 Many businessmen and lawyers 
involved with international trade and investments seem to accept that, with the increasing 
                                                            
*E-mail:chandramohan@smu.edu.sg [This paper has been published in the International Insolvency Review (Winter 2012), 
vol. 21,Issue 3, pp199-223] 
+Associate Professor (Practice), Singapore Management University. The author, as Official Receiver, was Singapore’s 
representative on the Working Group that helped to draft the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency. Research 
for this paper was assisted by a research grant from the Singapore Management University. I am also grateful to my student 
Zack Quek Zheng An for his research assistance.  
1 Due, for example, to various initiatives to remove trade barriers and the increasing number of financial conglomerates and 
multinational enterprises. This has also been partly attributed to the relaxation in exchange controls laws and other foreign 
investment regulations: R.W.Harmer, “The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency”, (1997) 6 International 
Insolvency Review 145 at 146. Businesses may fail due to a variety of reasons including poor management and inefficient 
production of goods and services or changes in laws and regulations : Rosalind Mason, “Cross-Border Insolvency Law : 
Where Private International Law and Insolvency Law Meet”, in Paul J Omar (ed), International Insolvency Law (Ashgate 
Publishing 2008) 28. 
2 Neil Cooper and Rebecca Jarvis, “Recognition and Enforcement of Cross-Border Insolvency”, (John Wiley & Sons 1996). 
A “truism of a free market economy is that there will be insolvencies”; Kent Anderson, “The Cross-border Insolvency 
Paradigm :  A Defense of the Modified Universal Approach Considering the Japanese Experience”, (2000) 21 U. Pa. J. Int’l 
Econ. L. 679. 
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globalization of businesses with assets in several countries, there is a need for a common set 
of insolvency rules across nations. Very often these issues become apparent in the insolvency 
of a large single corporation with assets located in several jurisdictions as happened in the 
well known Maxwell Communications Corporation,3 the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International 4 and the Lehman Brothers 5 cases.  
In such situations, as the World Bank has recognised, the cooperation of courts and 
administrators in international insolvency proceedings only helps to support the “goal of 
maximizing the value of the debtor’s worldwide assets, protecting the rights of the debtors 
and creditors and furthering of the just administration of the proceedings”.6 The real 
challenge to administrators, policy makers and insolvency practitioners is in finding and 
accepting universal solutions in bringing this about. Why has this been so difficult if there is 
an obvious need to do so? Are there indeed common answers to the many problems said to be 
associated with cross-border insolvencies ?  
 
   II.    Cross-Border Insolvency Problems 
There are a number of possible cross-border insolvency problems that have been  articulated 
in the now abundant literature on the topic in recent years. The concern often is whether these 
problems are recognized in all countries and whether their court systems and insolvency 
administrators are able to deal with them expeditiously. 
A. Varied jurisdictional interests 
Cross-border insolvency proceedings can be inefficient, prolonged and costly. This is largely 
because insolvency rules in different languages, in different countries, under different legal 
systems and traditions are not always uniform or consistent. Where insolvency proceedings 
are governed by the laws of several jurisdictions, various conflicts of laws issues are bound to 
arise7 especially as regards the recognition of court decisions and regulations of foreign 
jurisdictions, judicial recognition and enforcement of foreign judicial proceedings, 
recognition of the claims of foreign creditors and the differences in the applicable laws in the 
disposable of assets. Insolvency orders are mostly a method of enforcing monetary court 
judgments and it is unrealistic to expect courts not to be particular about the enforcement of 
insolvency orders from many countries with different laws and legal systems.  
                                                            
3 [1992] BCC 757. 
4 [1992] BCC 83. 
5 Discussed in detail by Jamie Altman, “A Test Case in International Bankruptcy  Protocols : The Lehman Brothers 
Insolvency”, 12 (2011) San Diego Int’l L.J. 463-495. 
6 World Bank, Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems, April 2001. 
7 Ian F. Fletcher, The Law of Insolvency  (4th edn., Sweet & Maxwell 2009). 
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Then there is the problem of different insolvency administrators requiring assistance of 
national courts and authorities to principally bring about benefits to foreign creditors. 
Territoriality or the upholding of domestic laws over the laws of other states is a sensitive 
issue as it is so much part of the concept of state sovereignty. There is in this area an on-
going debate on the advantages and disadvantages of various approaches to insolvency 
resolution including universalism, modified universalism, territorialism and contractualism.8 
 
  III.  Attempts at Global Agreements 
Despite the expansion of trade across borders, the need for some uniformity in dealing with 
insolvency issues arising between States and even a call for an international insolvency 
convention by some British judges,9 there were few attempts to have any global agreement on 
cross-border insolvency legislation before the UNCITRAL Model Law in 1997. Earlier 
efforts by such institutions as the International Bar Association10 have been largely “best 
practices” guidelines and it remains to be seen whether the Model Law will be seen any 
differently. 
 
            IV. The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency 
Following a discussion11 on the growing significance of cross-border insolvency issues in 
1992, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)12 and the 
International Association of Restructuring, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Practitioners (INSOL) 
examined the need to have international co-operation on cross border insolvency issues. Two 
                                                            
8 It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider these approaches in detail. For a fuller discussion of these and related 
approaches see for example,  Irit Mevorach, Insolvency within Multinational Enterprise Groups, (Oxford University Press 
2009); John A.E.Pottow, “Procedural  Incrementalism : A Model for International Bankruptcy”, (2005) 45 Virginia  Journal 
of International  Law 935; Bob Wessels, Bruce A Markell and Jason J. Kilborn, International Cooperation in Bankruptcy 
and Insolvency Matters (Oxford University Press 2009) chapter 3; Kent Anderson, “The Cross-Border Insolvency Paradigm 
: A Defense of the Modified Universal Approach Considering the Japanese Experience”, (2000) 21 U.Pa.J.Int’l Econ.L. 679. 
 
9 Sir Nicholas Browne-Wilkinson VC in Re Bank of Credit and Commerce International (No.3) [1992] BCC 83 at 89; Sir 
Donald Nicolls VC in Re Paramount Airways Ltd [1993] 3 All E.R.1 at 11; Hoffman J in Re Maxwell Communications Corp 
plc (No.2) [1992] BCC 757 at 766. For a fuller discussion see Sir Peter Millet, “ Cross-Border Insolvency : The Judicial 
Approach”, (1997) 6 International Insolvency Review 99-113. 
10 International Bar Association Cross Border Insolvency Concordat, 1995,  being  an early attempt to develop a framework 
for harmonizing cross-border insolvency proceedings. Available online at 1995 
IBA_Resolutions_Cross_Border_Insolvency_Concordat_1995.pdf; Bob Wessels, Cross-Border Insolvency Law: 
International  Instruments and Commentary, (Luwer Law International BV 2007) Annex 9. An earlier effort of the IBA with 
a model law during the 1980s was less successful : Ian F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law ( 2nd edn., OUP 
2005) 446-447; Pottow (n 8) 958. See also a comment by Elizabeth k Somers, “The Model International Insolvency 
Cooperation Act : An International Proposal for Domestic Legislation”, (1991) 6 Am.J.Int’l & Pol’y 677. 
11 Jenny Clift, in the Foreward  to the first edition of Look Chan Ho (Ed.), Cross-Border Insolvency : A Commentary on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law ( Global Business Publishing  2006). The book is now in its 3rd edition (2012). 
12 UNCITRAL was established by General Assembly Resolution in 1966 and consists of 36 member states. In addition a 
number of observer states and governmental and private international bodies were present at its meetings. 
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joint international colloquia13 were subsequently held in 1994 and 1995 to explore issues on 
which there appeared to be sufficient consensus. 
 
The Colloquia were attended by judges, governmental officials, insolvency practitioners, 
lenders, and other interested groups. There was broad agreement that judicial cooperation 
could do well with a legislative framework for the resolution of cross border insolvencies14 
on a number of issues, including co-operation between the courts of the states where debtors’ 
assets were located, granting access to local courts by foreign insolvency representatives, 
granting recognition to certain orders by foreign courts and granting relief to assist foreign 
insolvency proceedings.15 
 
Encouraged by these developments, UNCITRAL initiated a project to draft a model law on 
cross-border insolvency. Seventy-two states, seven inter-governmental organisations and ten 
non-governmental organisations took part in the working group that discussed a draft model 
law between 1995 and 1997.16 The Model Law was adopted by UNCITRAL at its 30th 
session on May 30, 1997, despite the Working Group not having completed its review of the 
draft of the Model Law and noting in its January 1997 session report that “it would have 
wished to have some more time available for completing its review of the draft”.17 The Model 
Law was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in December 1997. 
 
 
  V. Why the Model Law Should be Widely Adopted by States 
 
                                                            
13 Report on UNCITRAL-INSOL Judicial Colloquium on Cross-Border Insolvency, U.N. GAOR, 28th Session. Note by the 
Secretariat 1 10, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/413 (1995) [hereinafter ‘Secretariat Insolvency Report’]. 
 
14 Secretariat Insolvency Report, para 14; Harold S. Burman, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law: A United 
States Perspective, (1996) 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2543. 
 
 
15 Jenny Clift, in the Forward to the 1st edition of Look Chan Ho (Ed.), Cross-Border Insolvency : A Commentary on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, (Global Business Publishing Ltd : 2006, UK). This book is now in its 3rd edition (2012).Mention 
should also be made of the efforts of the International Bar Association which had in place by 1995 a Cross-Border 
Insolvency Concordant which spelt out an insolvency process which had received some international recognition as being 
consistent, fair and convenient. See  Harold S. Burman, footnote 26. 
16 Jenny Clift, in the Foreward  to the 1st edition of Look Chan Ho (Ed.), Cross-Border Insolvency : A Commentary on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, (Global Business Publishing Ltd : 2006, UK). The writer was a member of the working group and 
participated in its deliberations on behalf of Singapore. 
17 Report of the Working Group on its work at its 21st Session (New York, 20-31 January 1997) A/CN.9/435, paragraph 16. 
The Working Group’s report noted at paragraph 14 that it “did not have time to review the draft articles that had been 
prepared pursuant to its consideration”. It had expected to return for a final session in October 1997 to complete its report, 
but that was not to be as the incomplete draft was adopted by UNCITRAL in May 1997. The recollection of Berends, the 
Netherlands representative on the Working Group, appears to be different from mine. According to him the Working Group 
decided to present its incomplete report to UNCITRAL “hoping the draft would be finished by the time the Commission 
met” : Andre J. Berends, “The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency: A comprehensive review”, 6 Tulane 
Journal of International Comparative Law (1998) 309 at 318. This is not supported by the Report of the Working Group as 
indicated above. However, it seemed to have been accepted by delegates at the UNCITRAL’s 30th Session in May 1997 that 
the US was the prime mover in getting the incomplete model law speedily adopted by UNCITRAL. However, the US itself 
did not adopt the model law until 2005, some eight years later. 
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A. Nature of the Model Law18 
 
As modestly described by UNCITRAL, the Model Law was designed to “assist States to 
equip their insolvency laws with a modern, harmonized and fair framework to address more 
effectively instances of cross-border insolvency”.19 Accordingly, the UN Resolution in 
December 1997 recommended that, in reviewing their legislation, States give “favourable 
consideration” to the Model Law.20 The Model Law is a short document consisting of only 32 
articles and accompanied by an explanatory Guide to Enactment. These have been said to be 
built on four principles of “access” by a foreign representative to the courts of the enacting 
State, “recognition” by the state of the foreign proceedings, “relief” which ensures the 
granting of interim reliefs pending recognition and “co-operation” and “co-ordination” which 
require courts and insolvency administrators in various states to communicate and co-operate 
for maximization of assets for the benefit of all creditors.21 That it contains rather partial and 
general provisions permitting States to develop the four principles has been said to add to its 
appeal.22 
 
The Model Law, unlike a multilateral convention, merely provides a legislative guide for 
States to modify their laws to ensure consistency of insolvency laws and practices between 
different countries. The UN Working Group that drafted the Model Law was quite content to 
deal with a Model Law rather than a convention.23 The Model Law thus confers the freedom 
on a State to decide how it wishes to incorporate the Model Law into its domestic legislation. 
This alone, according to some commentators, should ensure support for its adoption.24  
 
                                                            
18 Published in the UN official languages of Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish. There is abundant 
literature on the Model Law. See for example Andre J Brends, (n 17); Look Chan Ho (ed.), Cross-Border Insolvency : A 
Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law, (Global Business Publishing Ltd : 4th edn., 2012); John A.E.Pottow, (n 
8);Jenny Clift (n 28). 
19 See the UNCITRAL website at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model.html. 
20  72 Plenary Meeting on 15 December 1997, item Agenda 57, available at http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/764/77/PDF/N9876477.pdf?OpenElement (accessed on 15 May 2012). 
21 See http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewdownload/636/5231.html. 
22 Bob Wessels, Bruce A Markell and Jason J. Kilborn, International Cooperation in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Matters 
(Oxford University Press 2009), para  8.2.1.4, page 250. 
 
23 See Andre J. Berends, “The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency: A comprehensive review”, (1998) 6 
Tulane Journal of International Comparative Law 309. Berends, the Netherlands representative on the Working Group, 
remembers our discussions at the Working Group’s sessions on whether a convention should be recommended instead of a 
Model Law. In my own recollection, these discussions seemed to be ongoing at every session. The majority of the delegates  
did not think they had a mandate to discuss a convention and felt they were present to consider only a model law draft that 
had been prepared and circulated by the UNCITRAL secretariat before the sessions. They also had modest expectations of 
the outcome of the discussions which would have been a lot more drawn out and inconclusive if a draft convention had been 
suddenly thrust before them.  
  
24 Bob Wessels, Bruce A Markell and Jason J. Kilborn, International Cooperation in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Matters 
(Oxford University Press 2009) 202, citing Pottow, (n 8 ). According to Professor Fletcher, however, the fact that a Model 
Law is only a legislative guide enabling a State to decide how much or how little of the Model Law it wishes to accept “is 
likely to be viewed by some as the Achilles’ heel of this form of international harmonization” :  Ian F. Fletcher, Insolvency 
in Private International Law ( 2nd edn., OUP 2005) 486. 
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B. The Model Law’s accommodation or concessions 
 
To encourage the adoption of its provisions, the Model Law contains a number of provisions 
that can best be described as ‘concessions’. Some of these too, as will be considered 
elsewhere in this paper, may also militate against the adoption of the Model Law. 
 
Article 1(2) of the Modern Law permits a State to exclude from the operation of the Model 
Law, any special entity, such as a bank or insurance company, that may be subject to a 
“special insolvency regime”.25 The reason for the exclusion of such entities is that their 
insolvency may require the protection of the interests of a large number of individuals.  
 
Article 3 preserves the right of a State to honour its treaty or other agreement obligations 
should there be a conflict between the treaty and the Modern Law. It expresses the principle 
of the supremacy of international treaty obligations of a state.26 
 
Article 6 further enshrines the public policy exception in that it provides that a state court 
may refuse to “take an action governed by this Law if the action would be manifestly 
contrary to the public policy” of the State. The Article does not define “public policy” as “the 
notion of public policy is grounded in national law and may differ from State to State”.27 
 
 
C. UNCITRAL’s efforts towards its enactment and implementation 
 
It is to UNCITRAL’S credit that its efforts, both before and after the Model Law came into 
being, to ensure its success have been spectacular. In the years leading to the working 
Group’s deliberations there were a large number of workshops, colloquia and consultations 
involving judges, government officials and insolvency experts and practitioners. 28 
 
Since the adoption of the Model Law in May 1997, UNCITRAL has also vigorously pushed 
for the adoption of the Model Law by States. It has done this in several ways. 
 
                                                            
25 Paragraphs 60-61, UNCITRAL’s Guide to the Enactment of the Model Law 1997 available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf (accessed on 16 May 2012). UNCITRAL accepted that 
for these reasons, “the insolvency of such types of entities is in many States administered under a special regulatory regime” 
which the Model Law should respect.  
 
26 Para 76, UNCITRAL’s Guide to the Enactment of the Model Law 1997 available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf (accessed on 16 May 2012). 
27 Para 86, ibid. Para 87 of the Guide gives a more detailed explanation : “In some States the expression "public policy" may 
be given a broad meaning in that it might relate in principle to any mandatory rule of national law. In many States, however, 
the public policy exception is construed as being restricted to fundamental principles of law, in particular constitutional 
guarantees; in those States, public policy would only be used to refuse the application of foreign law, or the recognition of a 
foreign judicial decision or arbitral award, when that would contravene those fundamental principles. 
 
28 Bob Wessels, et al., (n 24) 199; Jenny Clift, “The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency – A Legislative 
Framework to Facilitate Coordination and Cooperation in Cross-Border Insolvency”, (2004) 12 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L.398. 
A list of the colloquia is also available at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquia_insolvency.html 
(accessed on 3 September 2012). 
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First, from the beginning, UNCITRAL provided a useful Guide to the Enactment of the 
Model Law 1997. It apparently considered that the Model Law would be more effectively 
used by legislators if the Guide could give “background and explanatory information”29 
aimed at directors and other government officials having the duty to make legislative 
changes. It was also meant to provide other users of the Model Law such as judges, 
practitioners and academics with information about the Model Law for wider use and 
dissemination.  
 
In addition, in 2004, UNCITRAL produced a Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law for the 
use of States when enacting new or reviewing existing insolvency laws. This may well have 
been partly due to UNCITRAL’s realisation that it was not possible to promote the adoption 
of procedural laws alone, as originally intended with the Model Law, without advising on 
necessary changes to substantial law. Another novel attempt perhaps to win new converts. 
The Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law , therefore, makes frequent references to the Model 
Law and rather cleverly also includes the text of the Model Law and the Guide to the 
Enactment of the Model Law “to facilitate consideration of cross-border insolvency issues”.  
 
In 2009, UNCITRAL published the Practice Guide on Cross-Border Insolvency 
Cooperation. This document provides information for insolvency practitioners and judges on 
“practical aspects of cooperation and communication in cross-border insolvency cases”.30 
The Commission’s further work on “coordination and cooperation in cross border insolvency 
cases”,31 was needed particularly with regard to cross-border agreements as this was viewed 
as closely related to the promotion of the Model Law. UNCITRAL had again taken the 
opportunity to create further awareness of the Model Law and to demonstrate its importance 
in order to encourage adoption by more States. 
 
Secondly, UNCITRAL provides technical assistance to promote its work and “the use and 
adoption of the legislative and non-legislative texts it has developed to further the progressive 
harmonization and unification of private law”.32 UNCITRAL’s technical assistance is readily 
available to States considering adopting the Model Law as part of their domestic insolvency 
legislation.  
 
Thirdly, UNCITRAL maintains a data base of court decisions and model law texts 
(“CLOUT”).This promotes continuous international awareness of its legislative texts and 
                                                            
29 Para 9, Guide to the Enactment 1997 available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf 
(accessed on 15 May 2012). 
30 Available online at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/Practice_Guide_Ebook_eng.pdf (accessed on 17 
May 2012). 
31 Preface to the Guide, ibid., page iii. 
32 See the explanations given by UNCITRAL at http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/technical_assistance_coordination.html  
(accessed on 16 May 2012). This is pursuant to a general mandate given by the General Assembly to further the “progressive 
harmonization and unification of the law of international trade”. 
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assists in maintaining consistency in their interpretation and application. This again will be an 
encouragement to legislators to recommend adoption of the Model Law.33  
 
Finally, UNCITRAL has been involved with other institutions including the World Bank, the 
Asian Development Bank, the International Bar Association and INSOL in actively 
promoting the Model Law at various meetings, conferences, symposia and colloquia. 
 
 
D.  Institutional support for the Model Law 
 
Several global institutions have recommended the adoption of the Model Law. The Group of 
G22, comprising Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors of the twenty-two most 
significant economies, following its meeting in the wake of the Asian financial crisis in 
1997,34 encouraged “the wider use of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency or the adoption of similar mechanisms to facilitate the efficient resolution of 
cross-border insolvencies”. The International Monetary Fund35 too in 1999 recommended the 
adoption of the Model Law as an “effective means” of facilitating “ the recognition of foreign 
proceedings and the cooperation and coordination among courts and administrators of 
different countries”. The Asian Development Bank did the same in 2000 with its “Good 
Practice Standards”.36 The World Bank’s draft Principles for Effective Insolvency and 
Creditor/Debtor Regimes of 2005 was “reviewed and revised to incorporate updates to 
UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law”.37 Having worked closely with 
UNCITRAL in the drafting of the Model Law, INSOL has often used its meetings and 
conferences to promote the Model Law.  
 
 
 
 
                                                            
33 Bob Wessels, Bruce A Markell and Jason J. Kilborn, International Cooperation in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Matters 
(Oxford University Press 2009) 203. 
 
34 Para 2.5.1. titled ‘Key principles and features of effective insolvency regimes’ available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/g22/Ifcrep.pdf  (accessed on 15 May 2012). Para 8 of the G22-Key Principles and Features 
of Effective Insolvency Regimes, 1998 also states that an insolvency regime should provide for “fair rules on cross-border 
insolvencies with recognition of foreign proceedings such that provided for in the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency”. See Bob Wessels, Cross-Border Insolvency Law (Kluwer Law International BV 2007) Annex 5, 609.  
 
35 Orderly & Effective Insolvency Procedures (issued on 2 August, 1999) available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/orderly (accessed on 14 May 2012). 
36 According to ADB’s Good Practice Standard 16 , an insolvency law regime should include provisions relating to 
recognition, relief and co-operation in cases of cross-border insolvency,” preferably by the adoption of the UNCITRAL 
Model on cross-border insolvency.”  The ADB Good Practice Standards are reproduced in Bob Wessels, Cross-Border 
Insolvency Law (Kluwer Law International BV 2007) Annex 31.  
 
37 Revised Principles for Effective Insolvency and Creditor/Debtor Rights Systems (2011 draft) available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTGILD/Resources/Proposed_amendment_to_Principles.pdf  (accessed on 14 May 
2012). 
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E. Accolades for the Model Law 
 
Finally, there has been much praise for the Model Law and hardly any substantive criticisms 
of its provisions from both insolvency practitioners and leading academics.38 
 
 
VI. Measuring the Success of the Model Law 
 
If the success of a Model Law is to be measured either by the number of countries that have 
adopted it or “in terms of the quantity of the Law’s provisions that are adopted or the 
technical quality of the implementation provisions as an accurate embodiment of their 
intended substance”,39 then it may not be possible to regard the Model Law on Cross-Border 
Insolvency as a success. 
 
A. The number of adoptees 
 
As of September 2012, more than 15 years after UNCITRAL formally adopted the Model 
Law, only 18 countries and 1 British overseas territory have adopted it.40 Despite the haste to 
approve the Model Law at the UNCITRAL meeting in May 1997 41, only 7 states adopted the 
model law between 1997 and 2003. In December 2004, the UN General Assembly further 
encouraged all States to “continue to consider implementation of the Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency.”42 This and UNCITRAL’s continuing efforts may have partly encouraged 
another 12 converts including the United States of America, the United Kingdom, South 
Korea, New Zealand and Australia to adopt the Model Law between 2005 and 2008. The 
numbers certainly appear to have dwindled since 2006. How many states like Greece have 
felt compelled to do so, as part of their debt-restructuring process, is a moot question.43 Some 
                                                            
38 See for example R.W.Harmer, “The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency”, (1997) 6 International 
Insolvency Review 145; Bob Wessels, “Will UNCITRAL Bring Changes to Insolvency Proceedings Outside the USA and 
Great Britain? It Certainly Will”, (2006) 3 International Corporate Rescue 20; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, et.al, A Global 
View of Business Insolvency Systems 5 (Martinus Nijhoff  2010)246. 
39 Ian Fletcher : Insolvency in Private International Law, (2nd ed., OUP 2005) para 8.73, p.486. 
 
40 The states are Eritrea (1998), Japan, Mexico, South Africa(2000), Montenegro (2002), Poland, Romania (2003), 
Serbia(2004), British Virgin Islands, United States of America (2005), United Kingdom, Korea, Colombia, New Zealand 
(2006), Slovenia (2007), Australia (2008), Mauritius, Canada (2009) and Greece (2010). 
41 The Working Group had indicated that its work was incomplete and that it needed more time to finalise its report : Report 
of the Working Group on its work at its 21st Session (New York,20-31 January 1997) A/CN.9/435. See also comment in 
footnote 17, ibid. 
42 Resolution of the General Assembly at its 65th Plenary Meeting. 
43 Greece appears to have adopted the Model Law almost verbatim. According to a Greek commentator, the adoption of the 
Model Law is unlikely to have significant practical consequences as there have been few international insolvency 
proceedings affecting Greece, with only two published decisions on the EU Insolvency Regulations. Therefore, in his view, 
Greece’s adoption of the Model Law in 2010 “may be more of a signal to the world that Greece is diligent in improving the 
means at its disposal for dealing with economic crises, given the recent adverse publicity produced by its debt problems”. 
See Ioannis Kontoulas, “Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency by Greece”, available on 
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Asian countries like Japan and South Korea may have been influenced by the IMF funding 
assistance which was tied to corporate restructuring and adoption of cross-border insolvency 
laws.44 At the time of writing in September 2012, no country has adopted the Model Law 
after Greece did so in 2010.  
 
The belief that the adoption by the US and Great Britain in 2005 and 2006 “might encourage 
adoption by a wider circle of countries”45 has simply not materialised. Hopes that states may 
be influenced “into overcoming their scepticism of the Law’s value” if a number of 
commercially important countries adopted the Model Law were also not realised.46 More 
significantly, Germany, Brazil and the Asian economic giants of China47 and India have not 
come aboard. 
On the other hand, the 19 states that have adopted the Model Law also include some with 
insignificant economies such as Eritrea, Montenegro, Slovenia, Serbia, Greece and Mauritius 
and are unlikely to be involved in multiple cross-border insolvencies or to inspire others to 
follow suit. The numbers are disappointing when one considers the herculean efforts that 
have been mounted, which have described above, to persuade States to adopt the Model Law 
and the accolades that the Model Law has received. 
A closer scrutiny of the countries that have not adopted the Model Law is even more 
revealing: 175 of the 193 members of the United Nations (91%), 49 of the 60 UNCITRAL 
member states (82%), 22 of the 27 European Union countries (81%), 11 of the 19 G20 
countries (representing 20 major economies including the EU) (58%), 23 of the 34 
Organisation for Economic Development (OECD) countries (68%) and 5 of the 8 G8 
countries (forming 8 of the world’s largest economies) (66%). Even among the 38 countries 
regularly represented on the Working Group that drafted the Model Law, 31(82%) have not 
adopted the Model Law. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.potamitisvekris.com/_control/admin/_files/binaries/publications/fil_publications583362558.pdf  (accessed 
on 24 May 2012). 
 
 
 
44 The New Zealand Law Commission’s expectation that New Zealand’s trading partners would for this reason adopt the 
Model Law proved wrong :  New Zealand Law Commission Report on Cross-Border Insolvency”, Report 52 (February 
1999), para 98 and 113, available at www.nzlii.org/nz/other/nzlc/report/R52/R52-Select.html. 
45 Jenny Clift, a senior officer with the UN Office of Legal Affairs, in the Foreward to  the 1st edition of Look Chan Ho 
(ed.), Cross-Border Insolvency : A Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law ( Global Business Publishing  2006).The 
book is now in its 3rd edition (2012). 
46 Professor Fletcher had hoped that a  an early example  set by a critical mass of commercially important states might 
provide some sort of “moral leadership in setting global standards” in cross border assistance : Ian Fletcher (n38) 486-487. 
 
47 China is unlikely to join the band as it has already enacted a new Enterprise Law 2007 which makes no mention of the 
Model Law. Article 5 permits the recognition and enforcement of foreign insolvency proceedings but on the basis of 
reciprocity. 
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A comparison with the adoption rates of a number of other Model Laws was also made. If 
nothing else, it may be an indication of the importance that States attach to a model law on 
cross-border insolvency. Indeed, most of the other Model Laws seem to have a higher take up 
rate than the Cross-Border Insolvency Law, despite the latter’s purported importance to 
international trade. For example, the Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration 
(1985) has 67 adoptees (excluding many individual states in Canada, Australia and the US), 
Electronic Commerce (1996) 44 (excluding many individual states in Canada, Australia and 
the US) and Procurement of Goods, Construction and Services (1994) 29 and Electronic 
Signatures (2001) 21. 
B.  Quantity and Quality of the adoption of the Model Law 
Professor Fletcher was rather insightful when he wrote in 1999:48 
The proof of the Model Law will be in the enactment. The crucial question is not the 
number of States which take a conscious decision to enact the law but the extent to 
which they do so, both individually and collectively.  
Despite writing in a rather optimistic mood in 2006, Professor Wessels too opined that the 
success of the Model Law “is heavily dependent upon whether, and in what manner, 
countries choose to enact it”.49 It is, however, rather difficult to share any optimism for the 
future of the Model Law if we consider the manner and extent in which many of the 19 States 
have indeed enacted and implemented the Model Law. 
 
 In its Guide to the Enactment of the Model Law issued in 1997 UNCITRAL had advised 
States to “make as few changes as possible in incorporating the model law into their legal 
systems” in order “to achieve a satisfactory degree of harmonization and certainty”.50 
Obviously, the more changes that are made to the text of the Model Law, the less the 
harmonizing effect of the resulting domestic legislation.51 However, a number of the adopting 
countries have ignored this advice and have made significant changes to the model law or 
have introduced amendments which are quite inconsistent with the character and content of 
the model law.  
 
 
                                                            
48 Ian F. Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International   Law (OUP 1999) 361. The second edition of the book was published 
in 2005. 
49 Bob Wessels,”Will UNCITRAL Bring Changes to Insolvency Proceedings Outside the USA and Great Britain? It 
Certainly Will”, (2006) 3 International Corporate Rescue 200. Based on the number of countries (10 countries in 9 years), 
support by global institutions such as IMF and the World Bank and the Model Law’s reception even from authors outside the 
“English language comfort zone”, Wessels appeared be fairly confident in regarding the Model Law then as a “fait 
accompli”. 
50 UNCITRAL’s Guide to Enactment of the Model Law, paragraph 12 available at 
http://www.cnudci.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf 
51 An obvious caution given by Jenny Clift in a video conference address in 2008. 
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1. The Reciprocity requirement 
 
More than a third of the countries that have presently opted to adopt the Model Law in some 
form or the other have introduced a reciprocity requirement. South Africa,52 Mexico53, the 
British Virgin Islands,54 Romania55 and Mauritius56 have all legislated on the basis of 
reciprocity.57  
 
The South African approach to reciprocity appears to be the most restrictive as its Insolvency 
Act applies only to countries that are designated by the Minister. Mere adoption of the Model 
Law by a State therefore is no guarantee of reciprocity under South African law. Although 
South Africa was one of the first few countries to adopt the Model Law, its 2000 Cross-
Border Insolvency Act that introduced the Model Law appears to be dormant because of its 
reciprocity requirement.58 Even in early 2012 it was reported that no State had been so 
designated, thus leaving the Cross-Border Insolvency Act “in effect without practical 
application in South Africa”.59 The British Virgin Islands too, using a “designated country” 
approach to ensure reciprocity, is yet to bring into operation the Model Law provisions it 
adopted in its 2003 Insolvency Act and has apparently still “no plans to bring it into force”.60 
                                                            
52 Section 2 of the Cross-Border Insolvency Act of 2000, brought into force on 28 November 2003, which enacted the Model 
Law, however, restricts the application to only states designated by the Minister of Justice in the Government Gazette. 
Section 2(2) (b) of the Act further makes it clear that the Minister may only do so if he is satisfied “that the recognition 
accorded by law of such a State … justifies the application of this act to a foreign proceeding in such a State”. 
53 Mexican Commercial Insolvency Law (2000), Article 280, requires reciprocity with the state where the foreign proceeding 
is being conducted. See  Pablo Perezalonso in Look Chan Ho (ed), Cross-Border Insolvency : A Commentary on the 
UNCITRAL Model Law, (3rd ed., Global Business Publishing 2012)317. 
54 The Insolvency Act 2003, Part XVIII.  Article 437(1) of the Act defines a foreign proceeding as a collective judicial or 
administrative proceeding in, as in the case of South Africa, “a designated country” which means a country designated by the 
Governor by  notice published in the Gazette. 
55 See Article 18 of the Cross-Border Insolvency Law (637/2002) which contains a reciprocity requirement in respect of the 
recognition of a foreign proceeding. Reciprocity appears to be a pre-condition for the recognition of any foreign court ruling 
in Romania : see the comment by Alexandru Lefter and Laurentiu Pachiu in Look Chan Ho (ed.), Cross-Border Insolvency : 
A Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law, (Global Business Publishing, 3rd edn., 2012) 373 at 379. 
56 Part VI of the Mauritius Insolvency Act of 2009, which sets out the cross-border insolvency provisions based on the 
Model Law. For more detailed information, see Malcolm Muller’s commentary in Look Chan Ho, (n 54), 289-314. 
57 On the other hand countries like Spain whilst not formally adopting the Model Law has made sure it supports  the 
principle of reciprocity in its legislation introduced after the Model Law : Spanish  Insolvency Act 2003 (Ley Concursal 
22/2003), Title IX which was brought into force in September 2004. Chapter 1, Article 199 provides that “In the absence of 
reciprocity or due to a systematic failure of cooperation by the authorities of a foreign state, chapters III and IV of this title 
shall not be applicable with regard to the proceedings followed in that state”. For a comment on the Spanish law, see Marie-
Louise and Frederick Bulten, “ Introduction to Spanish Cross-Border Insolvency Law - An Adequate Connection with 
Existing International Insolvency Legislation”, Int. Insolv. Rev., vol 18 (2009) 59-76; Bob Wessels, Bruce A Markell and 
Jason J. Kilborn, International Cooperation in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Matters, (Oxford University Press 2009) 90-93; 
M.Virgo, “Cross-border Insolvency  Beyond the European Insolvency Regulation; The Spanish Solution”, paper presented at 
the Academic Meeting, Insol Europe, Amsterdam, 29 September 2006, 
 
58 K.D.Yamauchi,  “Should Reciprocity be a Part of the UNCITRAL Model Cross-Border Insolvency Law”, (2003) 16 Int. 
Insol. Rev 145 at169.  The Cross-Border Insolvency Act of 2000 was brought into force only on November 28, 2003. 
59 Rachel Kelly and Claire van Zuylen, comment on South Africa in Look Chan Ho, (n 55) 401-402. 
60 See (n 54) and the comment by Phillip Kite in Look Chan Ho (n 54) 55. Yet Great Britain, which the British Virgin 
Islands is a territory of, enacted the Model Law provisions in the Cross- Border Insolvency Regulations in 2006 without any 
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Similarly, the cross-border provisions in the Mauritius Insolvency Act of 2009 based on the 
Model Law, are not operative as they are still awaiting “such time as there is sufficient 
reciprocity in dealing with jurisdictions that have trading or financial connections with 
Mauritius or that are otherwise in the public interest”.61 Article 280 of the Mexican 
Insolvency Law of 2000, which incorporates the Model Law, has also introduced a 
reciprocity requirement.62  
 
In Romania the requirement for reciprocity has been “cleverly hidden” in Article 18 of the 
Romanian Law instead of being stated upfront in the introductory chapters of the Law.63 Thus 
foreign proceedings will be recognised only if there is a reciprocal arrangement for the 
recognition of judgments of the country concerned.  
 
It was at first thought that New Zealand law too would require the mutual recognition of 
insolvency proceedings by other States but this requirement was later abandoned. 64 Certainly 
one of the factors for the New Zealand Law Commission’s recommendation that New 
Zealand adopt the Model Law was the likelihood that its major trading partners, especially in 
Asia, would adopt the Model Law. The Commission therefore recommended that the Model 
Law provisions should not be implemented “until such time as the Government is satisfied 
that other States with which we have major trading relations have enacted the Model Law or 
will shortly enact the Model Law”.65 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
requirement of reciprocity upon a philosophy ‘that it should set an example for other countries’: Gabriel Moss, Ian F.  
Fletcher and Stuart Isaacs, The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings: A Commentary and Annotated Guide (Oxford 
University Press, 2nd edn., 2009) 560.  
 
61 Malcolm Muller, on the law in Mauritius, in Look Chan Ho, (n 55) 289.The rest of the Act came into operation on 1 June 
2009. 
62 Pablo Perezalonso in Look Chan Ho (n 55) 317. See also Sandile Khumalo,“ International Response to the UNCITRAL 
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency”, research paper presented to the Vrijie University in Amsterdam available on the 
website of the International Insolvency Institute – www.iiiglobal.org. (last accessed on 25 May 2012); Bob Wessels, et.al.(n 
56) 241. The first case believed to have been decided under the enacted Model Law in Mexico is the Federal District Court 
Mexico City ,19 December 2002, case of Xacur Eljure, which recognises a foreign proceeding (US Bankruptcy Court SD of 
Texas (Houston Division) of 22 April 1997) as a main foreign proceeding. The Court assumed the reciprocity provision to 
mean:  
(i) that an international treaty on commercial insolvency must exist;  
(ii) that Title XII will be applied only when the existing treaty on insolvency does not provide an alternative; and 
(iii) that international reciprocity must exist due to this treaty.  
See Wessels et.al. (n 55) 242; see a summary of case in www.iiiglobal.org and UNCITRAL’s CLOUT (case 639). 
 
63 Sandile Khumalo, ibid., at 24.See also the comment on Romanian law by Alexandru Lefter and Laurentiu Pachiu in Look 
Chan Ho (Ed.), Cross-Border Insolvency : A Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law, (Global Business Publishing, 3rd 
edn., 2012) 373 at 379. 
64 Sean Gollin on “New Zealand” in Look Choon Ho (n 55) 331-332. 
65 New Zealand Law Commission Report on Cross-Border Insolvency, Report 52 (February 1999): Should New Zealand 
adopt the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency?, paras 98 and 113, available at 
www.nzlii.org/nz/other/nzlc/report/R52/R52-Select.html. The  trading partners identified by the Commission included the 
European Union, China, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Hong Kong and Indonesia (in addition to Australia, the US,  
Japan and Korea). New Zealand adopted the Model Law in 2006, two years before Australia did so in 2008. However, as of 
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2. Exclusion of certain entities 
  
Article 1(2) of the Model Law contemplates the exclusion of proceedings concerning certain 
entities that are subject to a special insolvency regime in the State. States have taken 
advantage of this proposal to exclude a whole variety of different entities. New Zealand has 
excluded banks from the operation of the model law provisions. In addition, Romania66 has 
excluded all financial institutions that provide credit or investment services, stock exchanges, 
brokers and insurance companies and agents. Great Britain has done the same not only with 
UK insurance companies and credit institutions but also with EEA (European Economic 
Area) and third country credit institutions and insurers. This has created inconsistencies in the 
law.67 The US in turn has excluded investment institutions, stock exchanges, insurance 
undertakings, clearing houses, brokers and traders, banks, railroads, stockbrokers and 
commodity brokers but not foreign insurance companies.68 In Mexico, insurance companies, 
surety companies and “unincorporated government enterprises” have similarly been 
excluded. 69 
 
These exceptions are a lot wider than what the Model Law contemplates.  If the objective in 
having the Model Law is to cater for cross-border problems that may arise in dealing with 
assets in many jurisdictions and to avoid multiple proceedings, it is unclear how excluding 
such a variety of institutions that have a potential to involve assets in multiple countries really 
serve the Model Law’s purpose.70 The New Zealand Law Commission expressed a more 
rational view in stating that “considerable justification” is required to exclude any entity from 
the operation of the Model Law. Therefore, its “starting point” was that banks should be 
included in the Model Law “unless there are strong reasons which justify exclusion or 
modification”.71 The South African Law Commission too was persuaded not to recommend 
any exclusions.72 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
14 September 2012, 22 of the 27 European Union countries and none of the others listed above, other than the four indicated 
in paranthesis, have adopted the Model Law. 
66 Cross-Border Insolvency Law (637/2002), Article 2. See commentary by Alexandru Lefter and Laurentiu (n 55)374. 
67 Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations 2006, Schedule1, Article 1(2). See commentary in Look Chan Ho, (n 63) at 144-
146. Look regards the exclusions “as driven not by any well-reasoned principles”.   
68 Section 1501, chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code, effective from 15 October 2005. 
69 Bob Wessels, et al., (n 57) 242. 
70 This hardly supports the objective of “harmonising” insolvency procedures in different countries and can create confusion. 
For example, Glitnir banks Icelandic insolvency proceedings were recognized as a foreign main proceeding under chapter 15 
of the US Bankruptcy Code but would not be eligible for recognition under the British Model Law provisions as it is an EEA 
credit institution. Similarly, the Icelandic insolvency provisions of Landsbanki  Islands  hf  have been recognized under 
chapter 15 of the US law and the Canadian and Australian enactments of the Model Law but not under the British Model 
Law. See Look Chan Ho (n 63) 144-145 for details of these and other examples.  
71 New Zealand Law Commission Report on Cross-Border Insolvency : Should New Zealand Adopt the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency?”, Report 52 (February 1999), para 190. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded, after 
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3. The “Public Policy” exclusion 
 
Article 283 of the Mexican Commercial Insolvency Law of 200073 is much broader than 
Article 6 of the Model Law regarding the public policy exception. It prohibits the recognition 
of any foreign judgment or the application of foreign law which violates “the fundamental 
principles of Mexican law”. Similarly, Article 392(2) of the Polish Bankruptcy Recovery Act 
of 2003 makes clear that “the recognition of a foreign proceeding may not be contrary to the 
basic principles of the legal order in Poland” although Article 7, the Model Law’s public 
policy provision, states that this should be invoked only if the foreign order in question was 
“manifestly contrary to public policy”.74 There are other countries which have dropped the 
qualification of “manifestly” in adopting Article 6. These include the British Virgin Islands,75 
Serbia76 and Canada.77 Again, in a departure from the Model Law’s public policy exception, 
Article 6 of the Romanian Cross-Border Insolvency Law permits a Romanian court to refuse 
to recognise a foreign insolvency proceeding if it violates “Romanian principles of public 
order”.78 China wanted the word “manifestly” to be removed from Article 6 but it was not 
able to persuade the Working Group to agree. 
 
Section 1506 of the US Bankruptcy Code reproduces Article 6 of the Model Law in 
providing a public policy exception where it would be “manifestly” contrary to the public 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
further deliberations, that banks, which are subject to statutory management, should be excluded from the operation of the 
Model Law as New Zealand regulators ought to retain control of assets in New Zealand so that systemic financial difficulties 
can be minimised : see paragraphs 213-218 of the Report. 
 
72 South African Law Commission Interim Report on the Review of the Law of Insolvency : The Enactment in South Africa of 
UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency (June 1999), para 4.6 available at 
http://www.justice.gov.za/salrc/reports/r_prj63_crossborder_1999jun.pdf  (accessed on 24 May 2012). 
73 Mexican Commercial Insolvency Law (2000) implemented the Model Law in May 2000. Title Xll of the Insolvency Law 
regulates international co-operation in cross border insolvency proceedings. See note by Pablo Perezalonso in Look Chan Ho 
(ed), Cross-Border Insolvency : A Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law, (3rd ed.,Global Business Publishing 2012) 
318;  Sandile Khumalo, “ International Response to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency”, research 
paper presented to the Vrijie University in Amsterdam available on the website of the International Insolvency Institute – 
www.iiiglobal.org, at pp 17-18. 
74 See generally, note on Polish insolvency law by Michal Barlowski  in Look Chan Ho, (n 73) 349-372. 
75 Section 439 of the Insolvency Act 2003, part XVIII, of the British Virgin Islands has excluded the qualifying words 
“manifestly contrary”. See the note on the British Virgin Islands by Phillip Kite in Look Chan Ho (n 73) 55 at 58. 
76 Article 179 of the Bankruptcy Law of Serbia (104/2009): the Serbian courts may refuse to take any action under this law 
“if the action would be contrary to the public policy of Serbia”. The public policy exceptions are thus not to be interpreted in  
a restrictive manner contrary to the Model Law. See the comment by Tamara Bubalo and Bojan Vuckovic on ‘Serbia and 
Montenegro’ in Look Chan Ho (n 72) 393 at 395-396. 
77 Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (2009), Part IV, section 61(2) merely provides that the courts may refuse to do 
something that would be contrary to public policy. 
78 Article 7 of the Romanian Law number 637 of 2002, Title 1, which deals with the Model Law. For a more detailed 
commentary on the Romanian cross-border insolvency law of 2002, see the note of Alexandry Lefter and Laurentiu  Pachiu  
in Look Chan Ho (ed), Cross-Border Insolvency : A Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law, (Global Business 
Publishing, 3rd ed., 2012) 373-386; Sandile Khumalo (n 57) 23-24. 
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policy of the US. It has been suggested that as neither the House Report nor section 1506 
provides any guidelines on the definition of “fundamental policies” and as the procedural 
safeguards for creditors in the foreign proceedings vary significantly from those of the US 
creditors, there could be a constitutional challenge to the recognition of foreign proceedings 
or relief sought by foreign representatives in the US courts.79  
 
Article 21(3) of the Japanese Law on Recognition of and Assistance in Foreign Insolvency 
Proceedings (2001) allows a court to refuse recognition of a foreign proceeding considered to 
be contrary “to the public order or good public morals in Japan”80. Again there is no mention 
of “manifestly” in the Japanese legislation adopting the Model Law. 
 
 
4. The Foreign Representative 
 
The Model Law’s draft provisions in respect of the role and powers of the foreign 
representative and the protection of local creditors proved the most controversial and were 
subject to various changes during the Working Group’s sessions. There were animated 
discussions during the Working Group’s sessions on the role and powers of the foreign 
representative particularly in jurisdictions where there are official bankruptcy administrators. 
Some delegates urged others to consider whether these provisions would be acceptable to 
their government legislators and policy makers despite amendments being made to the 
original draft provisions. The discomfort amongst many of the Working Group members was 
as to the extent of the rights of a foreign representative following his application for 
recognition of a foreign proceeding under Article 19 and subsequently upon recognition 
under Article 21.81 Article 21(2) requiring the court to be satisfied that the interests of local 
creditors are “adequately protected” before the Foreign Representative is entrusted with the 
distribution of the debtor’s assets within the State was inserted in the Model Law after much 
debate.  
 
It is hardly surprising that the Foreign Representative’s right of access to the courts under 
Mexican legislation, for example, is subject to various restrictions. If a Foreign 
Representative has to make urgent applications for interim relief he can do so only through 
the local Inspector or Receiver and cannot make the application directly to the State courts.82 
                                                            
79  Richard G Mason, “United States” in the 1st edition of Look Chan Ho (ed), Cross-Border Insolvency : A Commentary on 
the UNCITRAL Model Law, (Global Business Publishing 2006) 202. See House of Representatives Report No.31, 109th 
Congress 1st Session, pt 1, at 109. Look’s book is now in its 3rd edition (2012); for the latest comment on the US law on the 
adoption of the Model Law by Selinda A Melnik, see Look Chan Ho (n 78) 437-544.  
80  For a commentary on the relevant Japanese law see note by Shin Abe in Look Chan Ho (n78) 277-288. 
81 These include having access to the State courts, obtaining a stay of execution against the debtor’s assets, being entrusted 
with the administration or realization of all the debtor’s assets in the State, staying all proceedings against the debtor’s assets 
and liabilities and being able to suspend all rights of transfer of assets of the debtor and to examine witnesses. 
82 Articles 298 and 300 of the Mexican Commercial Insolvency Law (2000). For sources and commentary on the Mexican 
legislation, see (n 73). 
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Presumably, the local receiver must first be satisfied as to the necessity for the foreign 
representative to make such applications. In a departure from Article 10 of the Model Law, 
which protects a foreign representative and the debtor’s estate from being subject to the local 
courts only because of an application for recognition, Canadian legislation permits the court 
to make an order for costs in the proceedings and to also subject the foreign representative to 
all orders of the court.83 
 
Polish law too has sought to deny the Foreign Representative any pre-eminent role in 
insolvency matters in Poland.84 Article 384 makes it clear that the appointment of a Foreign 
Representative by a foreign court has no effect on the jurisdiction of the Polish courts. It is 
the Polish courts that will have jurisdiction if the debtor conducts business, resides or 
possesses assets in Poland. 
 
Articles 9 and 11 of the Model Law entitle a foreign representative to apply directly to a local 
court and to commence proceedings under local insolvency laws. In the US, however, these 
rights of the foreign representative are conditional upon the foreign proceeding being 
recognised by US law.85 Section 1512(b) further provides that upon recognition of a foreign 
proceeding the court may entrust the distribution of the debtor’s assets in the US to the 
foreign representative “provided that the court is satisfied that the interests of the creditors in 
the United States are sufficiently protected”. The preferred application by the courts of 
territorialism has affected the proclamation of universalism.86 This demonstrates that even if 
a State crosses the hurdle of adoption, the implementation of its laws that purport to give 
effect to the Model Law might not always meet the spirit of the Model Law.87 There may also 
be other countries even in the list of 19 that may be unable or unwilling to cope with the 
intent of the Model Law.88 
                                                            
83 Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (2009), Part IV, section 57. 
84 See generally note on Polish insolvency law by Michal Barlowski  in Look Chan Ho (n78)349-372; Sandile Khumalo, “ 
International Response to the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency”, research paper presented to the Vrijie 
University in Amsterdam available on the website of the International Insolvency Institute – www.iiiglobal.org, at 21-22. 
85 Sections 1509 and 1511 of the US Bankruptcy Code. 
86  Lynn M LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, (2000) 98 Mich..L.Rev 2216 ; Jay 
Lawrence Wesbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies : Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65  AM. 
BANKR.L.J. 457; Charles D.Booth,  Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies : An Analysis and Critique of the Inconsistent 
Approaches of the United States Courts, 66 Am. Bankr.L.J.135; Selina A Melnik on “United States” in Look Chan Ho (n 78) 
462-466. 
87 An empirical study of relief granted under chapter 15 showed that the US courts were entrusting assets in such cases in 
only 45.5 % of the cases and of those entrusted 31.8% were accompanied by qualifying factors including those that favoured 
US creditors: Jeremy Leong, “Is Chapter 15 Universalist or Territorialist? Empirical Evidence from the United States 
Bankruptcy Court Cases”, (2011) 29 Wisconsin International Law Journal 110. 
88 For example, it has been suggested that while Greek courts are now  legally empowered to participate in cross-border 
coordination, there may still be some resistance due to the local legal culture, unwillingness of judges to surrender control 
over proceedings, an inadequate infrastructure that would impede local judges from participating in teleconferences and  the 
lack of proper understanding of the various possible forms of cross-border cooperation among the members of Greek bar 
associations :  Ioannis Kontoulas on the “Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency” by Greece, 
available at 
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South Korean legislation too, in a departure from Article 11 of the Model Law, requires a 
foreign proceeding to be recognised first in order for the Foreign Representative in order to 
commence local bankruptcy proceedings.89 
 
It is also significant to note that in a significant departure from Article 21(2) of the Model 
Law, Articles 25 and 31 of the Japanese Law on Recognition of Foreign Proceedings 
provides that a foreign representative must specifically seek the approval of the court before 
turning over the assets to a foreign country and the court must be satisfied that local creditors 
are not unfairly prejudiced before sanctioning such a move.90 
 
Additional Assistance to a foreign representative under Article 7 of the Model law by the 
court and bankruptcy administrator appears to be obligatory generally. But under Article 180 
of the Serbia Bankruptcy Law 2005 this is discretionary.91 Even if a foreign proceeding is 
recognised relief in support of the foreign proceeding is discretionary under chapter 15 of the 
US Bankruptcy Code.  
 
5. Other Deviations from the Model Law 
 
There are a number of other significant deviations from the Model Law including the  
recognition of foreign proceedings and the granting of interim reliefs, both key provisions of 
the Modern Law, the coordination of multiple proceedings and the ranking of claims of 
foreign creditors in a number of countries including Mexico,92 Japan,93 Montenegro,94 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.potamitisvekris.com/_control/admin/_files/binaries/publications/fil_publications583362558.pdf  (accessed on 24 
May 2012). There are three countries that are yet to implement the Model Law provisions although these have been enacted 
as part of their domestic legislation for many years: South Africa (since 2000), the British Virgin Islands (2005) and 
Mauritius (2009). 
 
89 See Article 634 of the debtor Rehabilitation and Bankruptcy Act which was passed in 2005. See the commentary by 
Chiyong Kim in Look Chan Ho (n 76) 421 at 429. 
90 Shin Abe in Look Chan Ho (n 76) 284. 
91 Ivana Rackovic & Bojan Vuckovic: “Serbia and Montenegro”, in Look Chan Ho (ed), Cross-Border Insolvency : A 
Commentary on the UNCITRAL Model Law, (Global Business Publishing, 3rd ed., 2012) 393 at 396. 
92 Mexican Law, for example, omits the requirement in Article 17 (3) of the Model Law that an application for recognition of 
a foreign proceeding “shall be decided at the earliest possible time”.  
 
93 Japan has adopted the Model Law with a large number of modifications in its Law on Recognition of Foreign Proceedings. 
The Law has no provision for the automatic effect of recognition of a foreign main proceeding as Article 20 of the Model 
Law requires, although a court has the powers to grant such relief upon the application of an interested party. More 
significantly, the provisions on coordination of multiple proceedings, an important objective of the Model Law, are 
confusing. In addition not all the reliefs contemplated in Article 19 of the Model Law upon the application for recognition of 
a foreign proceeding needed to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of creditors are available under Japanese 
Law.93 These differences from the Model Law have been described as “striking”: Wessels et.al. (n55) 241.For a commentary 
on the relevant Japanese law, see also note by Shin Abe in Look Chan Ho (n 91) 97-114; Sandile Khumalo (n 77)14-15. 
94 Montenegro adopted the Model Law in 2000. It forms part of the Law on Business Organization Insolvency. Montenegro 
has also not provided for any of the interim reliefs that are provided under Article 21 of the Model Law. These include the 
important reliefs as to the stay of commencement of proceedings regarding debtors’ assets, stay of execution against debtors’ 
assets and suspending the right to transfer debtors’ assets which are fundamental to insolvency proceedings. 
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Greece95, Poland,96 Colombia97 and South Korea.98 These significant caveats, the number of 
the countries yet to bring the Model Law provisions in their domestic laws into operation99 
and the absence of large numbers of States failing to adopt the Model Law supports the view 
that at least in the area of insolvency, perceived global problems do not necessarily call for 
universal legislative answers or for “harmonisation” of laws and procedures.   
 
 
VII. Suggested reasons for the Model Law’s limited success 
 
There are various reasons which may be suggested for the apparent reluctance of countries 
not to adopt the Model Law even in part. For a start, it is not a treaty or convention but a 
recommended legislative text which does not compel adoption or implementation100.  
Countries always have a choice. Conversely, flexibility to adapt the Model Law to the legal 
system may well have encouraged deviance form its provisions despite UNCITRAL’s pleas 
not to do so101. Again, if the making of changes were not possible, many of the 19 countries 
that have adopted the Model Law with various changes may well not even have done so. A 
common argument against adoption is the need to preserve the sovereignty of a country to 
                                                            
95 Law 3858/2010, the Bankruptcy Code.  See comment by Ioannis Kontoulas on the “Adoption of the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on Cross-Border Insolvency” by Greece, available on 
http://www.potamitisvekris.com/_control/admin/_files/binaries/publications/fil_publications583362558.pdf (accessed  
on 24 May 2012). There are some major departures from the text of the model law in the definitions sections which have 
been noted in the Greek law which, according to Kontoulas, “could seriously minimize the benefit to be derived from the 
introduction of the new provisions.” For example, the definition of 'foreign proceeding', in a stark departure from the Model 
Law, rests on the debtor’s insolvency and appointment of a liquidator although a debtor need not be insolvent to rely on 
insolvency-related laws as in the Greek conciliation proceedings or in a judicial management without the appointment of a 
liquidator which will fall under a “foreign proceeding” under Article 2 (a) of the Model Law. Similarly the definition of 
“foreign administrator” omits that part of the corresponding model law definition that includes a person or body authorized 
to act as an administrator or representative of the foreign proceeding. 
 
96 Article 392(1) of the Polish Insolvency Law further provides that a foreign insolvency proceeding will not be recognised if 
the Polish courts have sole jurisdiction. This means that where the Polish courts consider that the centre of main interests is 
located in Poland, a concurrent main proceeding cannot be opened or recognised in another state. This may well result in 
concurrent main proceedings being opened in two states against the same debtor, contrary to the objectives of the Model 
Law : Michal Barlowsky (n 74)135.Further, foreign debts which are not civil debts are not recognised. What is also a 
departure from the Model Law is that Polish Law does not provide for rules on the coordination of multiple proceedings and, 
where these are recognised, leaves it to the courts to determine the disposal of these assets.: Article 417 of the Polish 
Bankruptcy Recovery Act of 2003.  
97 Article 98 of Law 1116, enacted by the Congress of Columbia in 2006, has not incorporated Article 13(2) of the Model 
Law which provides that the claims of foreign creditors are not to be ranked below that of local creditors . 
98 South Korea has not adopted a number of the Model Law provisions including Articles 3, 7, 8 and 23 and has adopted 
others, such as Article 15,11, and 13(2), only in part. See Chiyong Rim’s comment on “South Korea” in Look Chan Ho (n 
78) 421-435.  
99 These include South Africa, the British Virgin Islands and Mauritius as noted elsewhere in this paper.   
100 The fact that a State may chose to enact as much or as little as it wants to, might be viewed as an “Archilles’ heel” of this 
attempt at international harmonization” : Ian Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law, (2nd ed., OUP 2005), 
paragraph 8.73,486.  
101 Guide to the Enactment, paragraphs 12 and 21. 
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enact its own laws, particularly in respect of assets within its own territory and to deal with 
these in accordance with its own laws.102  
 
A. National Interest 
 
There are lessons to be learnt from the numerous amendments that many of the 19 States and 
territories have made to the Modern Law. Many of these have simply proceeded on what is 
best in their own national interests. There are thus considerable difficulties in trying to arrive 
at similar insolvency laws and practices. 
 
 In the words of Sir Peter Millet, no branch of the law “is moulded more by considerations of 
national economic policy and commercial philosophy”.103 The need to protect local parties 
and economic interests is immensely important to most states, despite the temptation to 
articulate a seemingly enlightened universalist approach. For example, hardly any country 
has difficulty in accepting that foreign and local creditors ought to be treated equally, but the 
lurking fear is that it could lead to a sort of reverse inequality. If a foreign court or visiting 
foreign representative is to ultimately have control of and determine the disposal of assets, 
what really are the remedies of an aggrieved local creditor?104 States may thus be reluctant to 
enact legislation that would compel them to generally recognise all foreign bankruptcy 
judgments and orders and grant access to foreign insolvency representatives to their courts 
and to the assets situated within the state from all parts of the world. In the circumstances, 
reciprocity may be more important than merely protecting against what has been termed as 
“opportunistic behaviour”.105  
Despite the apparent similarity of general insolvency principles, national insolvency laws do 
differ from each other for many reasons including their relationship with State policy and 
societal norms.106 This highlights the main problem with international cooperation as there 
may not always be identical commercial interests in insolvency especially in the larger cross-
border cases which are subject to greater local media and public scrutiny.  
                                                            
102 Considered but rejected by the New Zealand Law Commission on the ground that this would act as a disincentive to 
foreign investment : The New Zealand Law Commission Report (n 71) para 104-105. See also Bob Wessels, Bruce A 
Markell and Jason J.Kilborn, International Cooperation in Bankruptcy Matters, (OUP 2009) 250. 
 
103 Sir Peter Millet, “Cross-Border Insolvency : The Judicial Approach”, (1997) 6 International Insolvency Review 99 at 
109. 
104 Wessels, et.al., (n 103) 43-45. 
105 Francesco Parisi and Nita Ghei ,”The Role of Reciprocity in International Law”, (2003-2004) 36 Cornell International 
Law Journal 93. On the other hand there is no evidence that states which have not adopted the Model Law  are presently 
disadvantaged in dealing with countries that do not demand reciprocity. The US courts, for example, appear to have granted 
chapter 15 orders to foreign representatives from countries that have not adopted the Model Law : K.D.Yamauchi (n56 ). 
106 Ian F Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (OUP 2005) 4-5; Ian F Fletcher, “Cross-Border Cooperation in 
Cases of International Insolvency : Some Recent Trends Compared”, (1991-1992) 6/7 Tulane Civil Law Forum 171 at 175. 
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 These concerns may not disappear despite the emphasis on the Model Law’s scope being 
limited to some procedural aspects operating as part of the existing national insolvency 
law.107. The reality is that many of the insolvency issues as regards disposal of assets and 
adjudication of creditors’ claims are determined by state laws which represent certain 
cardinal values that the State regards as important and which courts may feel bound to 
uphold.108 With only seven countries adopting the Model Law before 2004, UNCITRAL may 
well have been conscious that countries may not be able to have common procedural laws 
without attempting to “harmonize” the substantial insolvency laws. The resulting Legislative 
Guide on Insolvency Law in 2004 thus included the text and Guide to the Enactment of the 
Model Law “to facilitate consideration of cross-border issues”.109   
. 
B. Problems and Solutions 
 
1. How real is the problem? 
 
It is pertinent to ask whether the problems said to be associated with cross-border 
insolvencies in recent years are more apparent than real, at least from the point of view of 
State policy makers and legislators. There certainly are some well known cases of 
insolvencies which have had transnational interests but States must be convinced that the 
numbers of the cases and the issues raised in those cases require immediate, long term 
legislative solutions of the nature envisaged by the Model Law. 
The recent global financial crisis has also been said to have brought about a greater 
realization of the need for an international resolution framework,110 but then cross-border 
insolvency is not new. Problems associated with such cases appear to have existed for more 
than 700 years.111 As seen earlier, Model Laws dealing with subjects other than insolvency 
                                                            
107 Guide to the Enactment of the Model Law, paragraph 20; Wessels, et.al., (n 103) 200. 
108 Ian F Fletcher, Insolvency in Private International Law (OUP 2005) 89. Asian Development Bank’s comparative studies 
have shown considerable differences in the understanding of universal concepts. This has been attributed to the influences of 
such factors as the operative legal system tradition, the inheritance of insolvency laws from different systems, the influence 
of cultural attitudes, customs or traditions, differences in political and economic policies, extent of the development of the 
court systems and skilled insolvency administrators. See Insolvency Reform Laws in the Asian and Pacific Region : Law and 
Policy Reform at the Asian Development Bank (Volume 1) available at       
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewcategory/341.html 
 
109  UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law 2004, Para 3. In taking a cautious approach UNCITRAL’s aim is not to 
provide a single set of model solutions for an efficient insolvency regime but to assist “to evaluate different approaches and 
to choose the one most suitable in the national or local context”, which again may not be a good recipe for harmonization of 
laws.  
110 Sean Hagan in the Foreward to Rosa M Lastra, Cross-Border Bank Insolvency, (Oxford University Press 2011). 
111 Kent Anderson (n 8), citing Philip R Wood, Principles of International Insolvency 291 (referring to a 1204 treaty between 
Verona and Trent in respect of the debtor’s assets; Kurt H Nadelman, “Bankruptcy Treaties”, 93 U.Pa.L.Rev.58 (examining 
the Pope’s coordination of the insolvency of the Ammanati Bank involving assets in Italy, Spain, England, France, Germany 
and Portugal in 1302). English courts too have dealt with these issues for centuries : Richard Sheldon (ed.), Cross Border 
Insolvency, (3rd ed., Bloomsbury Professional 2011). 
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seem to have a higher acceptance rate than the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
despite all its purported importance to international trade.  
Professor Rasmussen has thus raised interesting questions112  on the assumptions on which 
documents like the Model Law rest, namely, that a transnational enterprise which fails will 
inevitably result in multiple insolvency proceedings in multiple jurisdictions. He attributes 
this to a universalist alarmist scenario of creditors rushing to seize assets in multiple countries 
in which these are located with the companies being forced into liquidation as a result. He 
argues that this assumption “rests uneasily with the realities of modern bankruptcy 
practice”113 as there are fewer cases than one would expect of multiple proceedings, even 
with financially distressed multinational enterprises. The reason for this is that debtors and 
their major creditors or lenders largely determine the number of countries where the financial 
problems of a company would be resolved. Professor Rasmussen disputes the “traditional 
account of transnational insolvencies”. He argues that the empirical reality is that multiple 
proceedings are less frequent than is believed to justify a universalist approach for fear of a 
territoriality grab of corporate assets lying in many jurisdictions.114 The vast majority of 
countries which are yet to adopt the Model Law may well be of the view that the problems of 
transnational insolvencies are more apparent than real. 
 
C. Other Solutions : Pre-Model Law 1997 
Since the problem is not new we must first consider the necessity for States to amend their 
legislation in accordance with the Model Law. Most States may already be content with their 
existing laws or with regional conventions or agreements in respect of cross-border matters 
which have provided adequate solutions even if there are problems raised by cross-border 
insolvencies. Many of these have existed prior to the Model Law in 1997. 
 
1. National Statutory Provisions115 
                                                            
112 Robert K. Rasmussen, “Where are all the Transnational Bankruptcies?  The Puzzling Case for Universalism”, Brook. J. 
Int’l  L., (2007)  32, 983-1003. 
113 Ibid., at 984. 
114 He points out that in the ten years before 2007, few of the 1448 US cases of public companies which filed for bankruptcy 
were involved in multiple proceedings. He assumes that a vast majority of these companies would have had assets in other 
countries although he concedes that this is an area which requires research. His examples of multinational companies include 
United Airlines, Sea Containers, Excide and Calpine where there were single bankruptcy proceedings in the US courts 
despite vast assets in many countries.  
115 Information in this part was obtained from an exhaustive survey that was done of cross-frontier recognition of foreign 
proceedings and practitioners in a large number of countries : Neil Cooper and Rebecca Jarvis, Recognition and Enforcement 
of Cross-Border Insolvency : A Guide to International Practice (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 1996). Since the survey, the law in 
some of the countries referred to above may have been changed because of new statutes, regulations and conventions. 
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Foreign bankruptcy orders and court appointed administrators are generally recognized in 
many States provided the foreign orders satisfy certain requirements.116 In others, foreign 
bankruptcy orders are recognized only on the basis of reciprocity.117 In most states, before 
any form of recognition can be accorded to a foreign bankruptcy order, it must be established 
that the recognizing state does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the matter and the foreign 
judgment is not against public policy.118 There are also countries where aid or assistance to be 
provided to a foreign court in specified countries is expressly stated in the law.119 Finally, 
many countries permit commencement of local bankruptcy proceedings on the basis of a 
foreign court order.120 
  
2. International Treaties and Conventions 
In addition, a series of regional insolvency agreements and treaties and conventions have 
provided consenting States a basis to deal with cross-border issues that may arise between 
them. Some of these have been in existence for decades. These include the Montevideo 
Treaty (1889) and the Bustamante Code (1928) involving fifteen Latin American 
Countries,121 the Nordic Convention (1933) signed by Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway 
and Sweden122 and OHADA (1995), the French acronym for "Organisation pour 
l'Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires", being a system of business laws and 
implementing institutions adopted by sixteen West and Central African states which were 
former French colonies.123   
                                                                                                                                                                                        
Further useful information is also available in Ian F. Fletcher (ed), Cross-Border Insolvency : Comparative Dimensions (The 
Aberystwyth Insolvency Papers),UK National Committee of Comparative Law (1990); Otto Eduardo Fonseca Lobo (ed). 
World Insolvency Systems : A Comparative Study, (Thomson Reuters Canada 2009).  
116 For example, that there was a final order made by a court of competent jurisdiction and the order is applicable to assets in 
the State: India, South Africa. 
117 Such as Israel, Nigeria, South Africa and Spain. 
118 Example, France, Germany, Canada, Argentina, Denmark, Egypt, Italy, South Africa. 
119 As in Australia,  Singapore, Malaysia, Jersey , Ireland ,Channel Islands, England, Isle of Man, Northern Ireland, 
Scotland. 
120 Canada, Denmark, Ireland. 
121 As early as 1889, the Montevideo Treaty on Commercial International Law was concluded between Argentina, Paraguay, 
Bolivia, Colombia, Peru and Uruguay. Title X of the treaty was devoted to bankruptcies. In 1940 Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay adopted a revision of the 1889 Treaty. This was followed by the Bustamante Code in 1928 which saw some 15 
Latin American countries agreeing on liquidation proceedings which included protection for local creditors. For details see 
Bob Wessels, Cross-Border Insolvency Law, (Kluwer Law International BV 2007) 27-29; Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Charles 
D. Booth, Christoph G.Paulus  and Harry Rajak,  A Global View of Business Insolvency Systems (The World Bank 2010) 
253.  
122Jay Lawrence Westbrook, et.al., ibid., 253. 
123 Also known as the Organisation for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHBLA), The 16 signatories are 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, the Central African Republic, the Comoros, Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d'Ivoire, Gabon, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Equatorial Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, Chad and Togo. It came into force in 1995. Under the 
treaty several Uniform Acts have been enacted in respect of general commercial law, debt collection, bankruptcy (which 
came into effect in 1999),and secured transactions. OHADA thus seeks to provide for the development of a rational and 
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D. Other Solutions : Post Model Law 1997 
 
1. Rules, Regulations, Principles and Guidelines 
 
There has been a growing volume of regional cross-border or transnational rules and 
regulations, directives, conventions, treaties, practice standards and guidelines on best 
practices since the Model Law came into being.124 Such initiatives are often based on 
regional or political and trade groupings. These have the advantage of reducing conflict of 
laws issues and are able to focus on laws and practices that have a common understanding. In 
recent years, a number of financial and professional bodies125 have also embarked upon 
various projects and studies relating to insolvency matters. As a result, there has emerged a 
proliferation of insolvency “principles”, “guidelines”, “good practice standards” and 
“recommendations”.126 
These no doubt emphasise globalisation of commercial trade and raise international 
awareness of cross-border insolvency problems amongst trading partners.127 The unintended 
consequence of the availability of these different instruments is that the Model Law may have 
become less relevant as helping to provide solutions to cross-border problems than at first 
envisaged. Indeed, some of these guidelines may prove more relevant and less intrusive, 
given the Model Law’s legislative prescriptions particularly in respect of foreign proceedings 
and foreign representative intervention. 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
harmonized legal system throughout the OHADA region. For further information on the OHADA treaty see 
http://www.jurisint.org/ohada/pres/pres.00.en.html; Sharif A. Touray, “The OHADA Treaty: Recent Developments Will 
Spur African Investment and Project Financings” available at http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Jul/1/130357.html (accessed 
on 17 September 2011); Bob Wessels, Cross-Border Insolvency Law, (n 111) 52-53, Annex 30; Joanna A. Owusu-Ansah, 
“The OHADA Treaty In The Context of International Insolvency Law Developments”,  
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewdownload/398/1555.html 
 
124 A useful compilation of some 35 of these can be found in Bob Wessels, Cross-Border Insolvency Law : International 
Instruments and Commentary, (Kluwer Law International BV 2007).  
125 Organisations such as the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, the IMF, the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, the  American Law Institute and IBA. The appearance of such bodies as 
UNCITRAL, INSOL, ALI, IBA and IMF has made it a global effort. 
126 Bob Wessels and Ian Fletcher, Global Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases (iiiglobal.org). 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewdownload/36/5303.html. 
 
127 Bob Wessels and Ian Fletcher, Global Principles for Cooperation in International Insolvency Cases (iiiglobal.org). 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/component/jdownloads/viewdownload/36/5303.html. These include the American Law Institute’s 
Principles of Cooperation among the NAFTA Countries 2000 and its Guidelines Applicable to Court-to-Court 
Communications in Cross-Border Cases 2000, the Asian Development Bank’s Good Practice Standards for Insolvency Law 
2000 the World Bank’s Principles and Guidelines for Effective Insolvency and Creditor Rights Systems 2001 (revised Draft 
December 2005),European Bank of Reconstruction and Development’s Core Principles for an Insolvency Law Regime 2004 
and Office Holders Principles 2007, the European Communication & Cooperation Guidelines for Cross-border Insolvency 
2007 and  Principles for Rescue of Multi-National Enterprise Groups (International Insolvency Institute, Draft June 2009. 
Some of these, including the IBA’s Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat 1995, the G22 Key Principles and Features of 
Effective Insolvency Regimes 1998 and INSOL’S Principles for a Global Approach to Multi-Creditor Workouts 2000 are 
intended to have a global reach. 
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There may also be additional problems for countries already bound by convention or treaty to 
follow certain insolvency regulations. For example, members of the European Union are 
directly bound by the EC Regulations on Insolvency Proceedings 2002 which contain 
provisions in respect of jurisdiction, recognition of judgments and the insolvency law.128  As 
the Model Law does not comply entirely with the EC Regulations, adopting the Model Law 
would lead to an EU member applying two different systems just to cater also for non-EU 
members, thus resulting in uncertainty and confusion. This has been suggested as a difficulty 
that Spain would face if she were to adopt the Model Law.129 In the UK it has been noted that 
there are differences in the rules pertaining to the exclusion of banks and other financial 
institutions and rules pertaining to jurisdiction and choice of law and the determination of the 
Centre of Main Interest between the Model Law provisions and the EC Regulations.130 At 
any rate it appears that EU courts are likely to apply the EU Regulations even where it 
involves non-EU countries.131 
Similar concerns also explain the reluctance expressed by some Canadian insolvency 
practitioners to Canada adopting the Model Law. They believed that the Canadian and US 
insolvency courts had already established a good working relationship to resolve cross-border 
problems. Hence, the Model Law with its own concepts and terminology would only 
complicate this rapport resulting in a “new era of uncertainty”.132 The Polish and Romanian 
legislative texts are said to have “some traces of the difficulties a legislator may face in this 
regard”.133 In addition, Berends134 opines that the EC Regulations were written for States who 
                                                            
128  For a fuller discussion see B.Wessels,“The changing landscape of cross-border insolvency law in Europe (2007),” 12(1) 
Juridica International 116; G Moss, I.F. Fletcher and S.Isaacs (eds), The EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings : A 
Commentary and Annotated Guide (Oxford University Press 2009); Manfred Balz, “The European Union Convention on 
Insolvency Proceedings”, 70 Am. Bankr .L.J 485. 
129 The option of implementing the entire Model Law would therefore not serve the purpose of increasing transparency and 
legal certainty at least in Spain : Marie-Louise and Frederick Bulten (n 57). 
130 See for example Moss, Fletcher and Isaacs (n 128) 96-101.   Anthony V. Sexton, “Current problems and trends in the 
administration of transnational Insolvencies involving enterprise groups : the mixed record of protocols, the UNCITRAL 
Model Insolvency Law and the EU Insolvency Regulation” (2011-2012) 12 Chi.J.Int’l L. 811 at 832. 
131 Mion C. Mion, “An Analysis of the European Community Regulations on Insolvency Proceedings : Its Past, Present and 
Future”, (2006) 13 New Eng J Int’l & Comp L. 17, cited in Anthony V. Sexton, “Current problems and trends in the 
administration of transnational Insolvencies involving enterprise groups : the mixed record of protocols, the UNCITRAL 
Model Insolvency Law and the EU Insolvency Regulation” (2011-2012) 12 Chi.J.Int’l L. 811 at 831. 
132 Andrew J.F.Kent, Stephanie Donaher & Adam Maerov, “UNCITRAL, eh? The Model Law and its implications for 
Canadian Stakeholders”;  (2005) Annual Review of Insolvency Law 187 discussed in  Jacob Ziegel, “Canada-United States 
Cross-Border Insolvency Regulations and the UNCITRAL Model Law”, (2007) 32 Brook J.Int’l L.1042 at 1061-1065. 
133 Bob Wessels, Bruce A Markell and Jason J.Kilborn, International Cooperation in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Matters 
(OUP 2009) 250. 
 
134 See Andre J. Berends, “The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency: A comprehensive review”, (1998) 6 
Tulane Journal of International Comparative Law  309. That was not always apparent in the drafting of the EC Regulations, 
judging by the history of the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings  which was a rather “protracted  process” over 
several decades : G Moss, IF Fletcher and S Isaacs (n 128 ), chapter 1. 
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share a certain culture with each other and have a relationship of trust suggesting perhaps that 
adopting the Model Law embracing the rest of the world may present difficulties.  
 
2.  Protocols 
Meanwhile, what has gradually emerged as a new viable solution to specific cross-border 
concerns is the use of protocols. If cross-border insolvency concerns can continue to be 
resolved by multi-lateral agreements between courts and administrators, the appeal for a 
general, less flexible, international insolvency legislative procedure, with all the attendant 
problems of jurisdictional interests and choice of law questions, may well diminish.  
A protocol is “nothing less than a tailor-made law for the individual case”135. Being 
essentially a private agreement between the parties in an international bankruptcy, it offers a 
specific set of solutions to cross-border cases on a case by case basis. They represent a “tool 
with the sharpest edge in any given case”136 as they address specific problems arising in a 
particular case which need to be resolved quickly. This ought to be welcomed by 
governments as bankruptcy is principally a private dispute between parties. As one writer 
commenting on a protocol entered into by American and Canadian parties in Matlack has 
pointed out the advantages of a protocol as the court “outlines its purposes, including 
harmonization, coordination, the promotion of efficiency and fairness, cooperation and 
transparency”.137 
 
Discovered in the wake of the Maxwell case, protocols have become important instruments 
for harmonizing the proceedings through a framework of “communication and coordination” 
between courts and parties138. As a result, many protocols have since been signed and these 
include the Lehman Brothers (2009), Bernard Madoff (2009) and Nortel Networks (2009).139 
The Lehman case140 involved the bank’s operations in over forty countries with seventy-five 
                                                            
135 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Charles D.Booth, Christoph G.Paulus & Harry Rajak, A Global View of Business Insolvency 
Systems, The World Bank, Washington DC, 2010, at 245. 
136 Anthony V. Sexton (n 131) at 817-818. Others have thus regarded protocols as being “essentially case-specific, private 
international insolvency treaties” : Evan D Flaschen and Ronald J Silverman, Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation 
Protocols, 33 Tex Int’l L J 587 at 589. 
137 Keith D. Yamauchi, “Should Reciprocity be a Part of the UNCITRAL Model Cross-Border Insolvency Law”, (2003) 16 
Int Insol Rev 145 at 166. 
138 Paul H Zumbro, “Cross-border Insolvencies and International Protocols – an Imperfect but Effective Tool”, (2010)11 
Business Law International 158; Jamie Altman, “A Test Case in International  Bankruptcy  Protocols : The Lehman Brothers 
Insolvency”, (2011) 12 San Diego Int’l L.J. 463; Evan D Flashchen and Ronald J Silverman (n 136). 
 
139 As listed by the International Insolvency Institute on its website at http://www.iiiglobal.org/gsearch.html. UNCITRAL 
has also provided a list of 36 protocols : Draft UNCITRAL Notes on cooperation, communication and coordination in cross-
border insolvency proceedings, 2009, A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.86. 
140 For a detailed examination of the Lehman protocol, see Jamie Altman, “A Test Case in International Bankruptcy  
Protocols : The Lehman Brothers Insolvency”, (2011) 12 San Diego Int’l L.J. 463. 
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bankruptcy filings in nine countries six of which have not adopted the Model Law. It was 
resolved with a cross-border insolvency protocol based on the Model Law. Many other 
protocols have been based on the Concordat141 and the ALI Court-to-Court Communication 
principles142 and the more recent European Communication and Cooperation Guidelines.143 
Despite the availability of such international initiatives as the Model Law and the EC 
Insolvency Regulations, there appears to be a growing preference for utilising cross-border 
agreements when faced with “the complexities inherent in the liquidation of a Lehman 
Brothers financial services firm or the restructuring of a Nortel telecommunications 
business”.144 If acceptable global solutions can thus be found in such ad hoc agreements and 
informal workouts and restructuring of businesses, there may be no pressing need for States 
to adopt such binding legislative texts as the Model Law.145 
 
 
        VIII.         Conclusion 
 
By all accounts, the Model Law is a good procedural framework for the efficient 
administration of cross-border insolvencies. Insolvency, however, requires the management 
of a lot more complex substantive issues in many areas of the law and policy in different 
jurisdictions. These seem to present some inherent problems with the acceptance of the 
Model Law, judging by the small number of countries that have adopted the Model Law and 
the diverse manner in and the extent to which they have done so. This does not augur well for 
its future as a compelling legislative text for States to incorporate into their national laws. 
What the future presently holds for the Model Law, in the light of many other statutes, 
conventions, agreements, guidelines and the successful development of ad hoc protocols, is 
to remain as yet another valuable guide in resolving cross-border insolvencies without having 
to become a binding legislative text. In other words, the Model Law does not appear to be 
able to provide States with what they need or do not presently have or cannot otherwise 
negotiate for themselves. 
 
 
                                                            
141 Jamie Altman, ibid., 477-478. 
142 Cases are listed in the International Insolvency Institute website at http://www.iiiglobal.org/gsearch.html. 
143 Developed by Professors Bob Wessels and Miguel Virgos in July 2007) available online at 
http://www.insol.org/INSOLfaculty/pdfs/BasicReading/Session%205/European%20Communication%20and%20Cooperatio
n%20Guidelines%20for%20Cross-border%20Insolvency%20.pdf (accessed on 14 September 2012).For a discussion see 
Wessels, Markwell and Kilborn (n 133 ) 39-71. 
144  Rosalind Mason, “Cross-Border  Insolvency and Legal Transnationalisation”, (2012) 21 International Insolvency Review 
85 at 107. 
145 UNCITRAL in fact recommends the use of protocols (Model Law, Article 27). For more information on workouts  and 
restructuring, see, for example, Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Charles D.Booth,  Christoph G.Paulus  & Harry Rajak,  A Global 
View of Business Insolvency Systems, The World Bank, Washington DC, 2010, chapter 5. 
 
